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  De acuerdo a la Enaho 2003, el ingreso medio de un trabajador indígena es 
sólo 56 por ciento del ingreso medio de un trabajador no-indígena. Sin embargo, los estudios 
sobre discriminación étnica en los mercados laborales de Perú usualmente hallan brechas 
demasiado pequeñas como para explicar la desigualdad observada. De acuerdo a la Teoría 
Sigma (Figueroa 2003), la exclusión social es una fuente de desigualdad interétnica, pero 
esto no ha sido contrastado empíricamente. El objetivo central de este documento es llenar 
esa brecha estimando qué porcentaje de la desigualdad se debe a exclusión y qué porcentaje a 
discriminación, comparando directamente los efectos. 
 
  Dos problemas econométricos surgen en el camino: i) la distribución de 
ingresos está truncada en cero, y ii) al incluir educación en las regresiones de ingresos surge 
el problema de endogeneidad econométrica. Para contrarrestar ambos problemas se utiliza 
‘modelos de barreras’ (hurdle models). Los resultados implican que la exclusión juega un 
papel más importante que la discriminación. Sin exclusión, el Gini de ingresos laborales se 





  According to the 2003 National Household Survey, mean labour income for 
an indigenous worker is only 56 percent of that for a non-indigenous worker. Studies of 
ethnic discrimination in Peru’s labour markets generally find that discrimination is too low to 
explain inequalities of this magnitude. However, Sigma Theory (Figueroa 2003) predicts that 
social exclusion is a source of inter-ethnic inequality, and that has not been empirically 
tested. The primary aim of this paper is to fill this gap by estimating the extent to which 
exclusion and discrimination contribute to income inequality. 
 
  Hurdle models are used to tackle down econometric endogeneity of years of 
schooling and truncation-at-zero of incomes. The results imply that exclusion plays a 
stronger role on inequality than discrimination: Without exclusion, the Gini of labour income 
would be reduced from 0.64 to around 0.45, and without discrimination it would be reduced 
to around 0.50.  
  3





1.  INTRODUCTION 
  Several studies have tried to measure the degree of ethnic discrimination in Peru’s 
labour markets (see for example Trivelli 2005, Figueroa & Barron 2005, Barron 2005, Ñopo 
et al. 2004, Mc Isaac 1993), generally finding little discrimination if any at all. However, 
according to the National Household Survey of 2003, mean labour income for an indigenous 
worker is only 56 percent of that for a non-indigenous worker. As shown in section 4, for the 
expected value of lifetime labour income, the figure is 44 percent. In addition, Peru 
systematically shows very high inequality indices (Gini and Theil’s T measure for incomes 
of around 0.55 and 0.80, respectively). Since discrimination does not appear to play an 
important role in this outcome, exclusion must be the main driver of inequality, but that 
haven’t been properly addressed in the literature. The primary aim of this paper is to fill this 
gap by estimating the extent to which exclusion and discrimination contribute to income 
inequality and compare their effects directly. 
  A further contribution of this paper is the implementation of an econometric 
methodology to obtain unbiased estimates of the coefficients. Two problems arise in the 
estimation: in first place, education is likely to suffer of econometric endogeneity; and in 
second place an important share of workers is unpaid, and thus the distribution of incomes is 
truncated at zero, therefore non-normality arises. Even though the first problem is usually 
taken into account, the second problem is not discussed in the literature. A two-tiered or 
‘hurdle’ model is used to asses these problems. The first tier assesses the probability of 
having positive dependent variable and the second one estimates the expected value of the 
dependent variable given that it is positive. Three methodologies were used to address the 
problem of econometric endogeneity in the second tier: instrumental variables, proxy 
variables, and household fixed effects.  
                                                 
σ   This paper is based on the thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of Master of 
Science in Economics for Development at the University of Oxford, June 2006. I am grateful to 
Sudhir Anand and Mans Soderbom for very insightful comments to previous versions of the 
document.  
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2.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
  Latin America is the most unequal regions of the world (Deininger & Squire 1996, 
Li, Squire & Zou 1998). A recent current of economic history has focused on the relationship 
between inequality and the colonial past of Latin American countries (e.g. Engerman & 
Sokoloff 2002, Acemoglu et al. 2002, Mahoney 2003). These authors share the idea that the 
dynamics of inequality are driven by inertia, meaning that current inequality depends on past 
inequality, process that has been called ‘path dependence’. Inequality is the heaviest burden 
from Latin America’s colonial past. 
  With fuzzy-set methods, Mahoney (2003) finds that countries with a dense 
indigenous population at the beginning of the XIX century experienced unsuccessful social 
development. This happened because in places with dense indigenous population, political 
elites chose to exclude broad spectrums of society from basic entitlements of citizenship; and 
in territories without a dense indigenous population political elites built nations that 
encompassed almost all individuals as citizens. Therefore, his argument goes, the density of 
indigenous population and the strength of liberal elites between 1700 and 1850 were critical 
factors in the linkage between colonial and postcolonial development. Poor regions were 
sparsely populated before the arrival of the Spaniards, which induced colonisers to settle in 
large numbers and develop institutions that encouraged investment. So, the critical factor 
appears to be the density of the indigenous population, which, as Mahoney argues, must have 
been strongly linked to economic prosperity. 
 Acemoglu  et al. (2002) show that societies with institutions of private property were 
able to industrialise, whereas societies with extractive institutions failed to do so. Extractive 
institutions, despite their adverse effects on aggregate performance, may emerge as 
equilibrium institutions because they increase the rents captured by the groups that hold 
political power. In this case, the argument is that a group of institutions that ensure property 
rights for a broad share of society are essential for investment incentives and successful 
economic performance. In contrast, extractive institutions concentrate power in the hands of 
a small elite and create a high risk of expropriation for the majority of the population, being 
likely to discourage investment and economic development. 
  Engerman & Sokoloff (2002) emphasise the role of factor endowments, which had 
profound and enduring impacts on the institutions. In societies with high initial inequality, 
elites were in better conditions to establish legal frameworks that would guarantee  
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disproportionate shares of political power and economic opportunities. Conversely, where 
initial inequality was low, political power was not concentrated. The first was the case of 
areas were the main Spanish colonies were established, Mexico and Peru, which had high 
shares of indigenous population. Conversely, the Southern cone (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, 
and Paraguay), the United States, and Canada had relatively low shares of indigenous 
population, so political power was more broadly distributed across society. 
  Summing up the different approaches, it may be argued that the indigenous density 
(the share of indigenous people in total population) determined the width of citizenship, 
which, in turn, determined the type of institutions that prevailed in the society. These 
institutions determined public policies regarding education, land, and health, as well as fiscal 
and monetary policies (tax system, social assistance programs, etc.); which set incentives in 
favour of either extractive activities or industrialisation. While the formers reproduce high 
inequality, the latter reproduces relatively low inequality. Hence, the initial share of 
indigenous population was a determinant of the degree of inequality. New questions arise 
now. What factors determined the density of indigenous population before the arrival of the 
Spaniards? Was it economic prosperity of the different regions? Or maybe central planning 
decisions by the corresponding empire? The answers to these questions constitute very 
interesting and challenging issues to pin down, but are beyond the scope of this study. 
  With the Spanish invasion, indigenous peoples went through a number of economic 
shocks over and above social degradation. In first place, they experienced a major 
demographic shock because of the diseases carried by the Spaniards, for which they did not 
have developed antibodies (Diamond 1997). In second place, labour was relocated massively 
from agriculture to mining, according to the main interest of the Spaniards. At the same time, 
indigenous people were expelled from the most productive lands, being left with the least 
productive or with none at all. These shocks in the main means of production (labour and 
land) originated severe disequilibria, and hence serious inefficiencies, which agglutinated the 
indigenous peoples in the poorest clusters of society. Moreover, their economic system 
(based on reciprocity and redistribution) was abruptly replaced by the Spanish, where the 
State was a fierce tax collector with practically no redistribution to the people
1.  
                                                 
1   In the case of Peru, the so-called ‘indigenous tax’ was one of the main sources of income during 
the time of the Viceroyalty, as well as during the first phase of the Republic. After being 
abolished and almost immediately reestablished several times, it was definitively eliminated  
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  In addition, indigenous people were excluded from formal education, literacy being 
an exceptional characteristic amongst them. By doing so, the Spaniards blocked their access 
to human capital, thus impeding their entrance to the modern sector of the economy and 
confining them to extractive activities. 
  Independence came after almost three centuries, but nothing changed for indigenous 
peoples in Latin America (Albó 2002). Literacy and landholding were conditions to vote and 
to run for public posts. This meant that the majority of indigenous people were excluded 
from electing the political authorities, but also that indigenous authorities were not able to get 
a place in the formal political system. Their exclusion was based on the grounds that 
indigenous did not have capacity of organisation, or that they could be easily manipulated. 
Nevertheless, indigenous organisations managed to rule politically over several countries of 
South America (the Inca Empire) and Central and North America (the Maya empire). Peru 
abolished the literacy requirement very recently, just in 1979. Even though this is not a 
sufficient condition, the right to vote is a necessary condition to eliminate inter-ethnic social, 
political and economic inequality (Ames ed. 1978). 
 
3.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
  Before spelling out the theoretical framework, two key terms must be clearly 
explained. The first one is for exclusion: 
‘A social group is considered excluded if it is not allowed to participate in 
some social relations of the social process which are desirable by the group. 
Exclusion implies the existence of hierarchies of activities and memberships 
inside the society.’ (Figueroa, Altamirano and Sulmont 1996) 
  Discrimination will be defined as different treatment to individuals that, apart from 
being of different groups, have similar observable characteristics. Hence, exclusion might be 
understood as discrimination in access. Both exclusion and discrimination are sources of 
inequality between-groups, and may interact reinforcing their effects.  
  A theoretical model is needed to explain the existence and persistence of exclusion 
and discrimination. Neoclassical theory cannot explain these phenomena. On the other hand, 
Sigma theory (Figueroa 2006, 2003) is a theory that can explain both phenomena based on 
                                                                                                                                                 
during the government of Ramón Castilla during an economic boom driven by guano exports. 
For a more detailed discussion of the indigenous tax in Peru, see Estela (2001)  
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the existence of Z-workers, an underclass formed by the descendants of indigenous 
populations in post-colonial societies
2. 
  Figueroa (2006: 22) shows that Sigma theory predicts the existence of exclusion. 
Regarding discrimination, Figueroa (2006: 11-17) clearly specifies the mechanisms through 
which, according to Sigma theory, education is transformed into human capital, and human 
capital into income. Z-workers (the indigenous population) face several disadvantages 
compared to the other ethnic groups (the white and the mixed). In first place, they 
accumulate less years of schooling than the other groups. Moreover, structural differences in 
the quality of education, peer effects, intellectual stimulation at home, command of language, 
and access to public goods imply that, with the same number of years of schooling, 
indigenous people accumulate less human capital than non-indigenous people. Since 
employers pay for human capital, a Z-worker will receive a lower retribution for his work 
than a Y-worker with the same years of schooling, because of differences in the non-
observable characteristics. According to the preceding definitions, this is labelled as 
discrimination.  
 
4.  DATABASE DESCRIPTION 
  The data were obtained from the 2003 Enaho (which stands for Encuesta Nacional de 
Hogares, Spanish for National Household Survey), run by INEI, Peru’s bureau of statistics. 
Monthly rounds took place between May 2003 and April 2004. INEI has been conducting 
Enaho yearly since the mid 90s, complying with the LSMS standards of the World Bank. 
  The survey covered 18,912 households, with 88,648 individuals. The estimated 
population is 6,184,824 households and 29,175,200 individuals. It is representative at the 
following levels: 
•  National 
•  Urban Peru 
•  Rural Peru 
•  Department (24 Departments plus the Constitutional Province of Callao) 
                                                 
2    The reader is strongly encouraged to refer to Figueroa (2003, 2006) for comprehensive 
expositions of Sigma theory.  
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•  Geographic sub-region (urban Coast, rural Coast, urban Andes, rural Andes, urban 
Amazonian, rural Amazonian) 
•  Metropolitan Lima (including Callao) 
  It also has a panel dimension, representative at the following levels: 
•  National  
•  Urban Peru 
•  Rural Peru 
•  Geographic region (Coast, Andes, Amazonian) 
 
 
5.  INCOME INEQUALITY BY ETHNIC GROUPS 
 
5.1  Ethnic markers
3 
  Ethnicity is a concept of heated debates in social sciences (Assies, Haar and 
Hoekema 2000). No single definition has been universally accepted. It is a fluid concept both 
in time and space. The purpose of this paper is not to develop a perfect ethnic variable for 
Peru but, given the available data, to use the best proxy for it in order to make inference at 
national level. This also constitutes a contribution to the literature because most studies of 
interethnic inequalities in Peru’s labour markets are not representative at the national level. 
  Ethnic markers usually include self-reported ethnicity, race, mother tongue, religion, 
place of birth. The feasibility of each of these markers will be assessed, and the best one or 
best combination of them will be used to identify empirically Peru’s main ethnic groups. 
  A point of departure is the importance of ascription by others versus self-
identification. In Peru, ascription by others seems to be more important than self-
identification. People would tend to hide their indigenous background because of 
discrimination. So, self-reported variables would tend to underestimate the size of the 
indigenous population. As will be shown below, Ñopo et al.(2004) illustrate this clearly. 
  Religion does not work in Peru, because Catholicism cuts across most of the groups. 
Mother tongue has been extensively used, but is not appropriate. Speakers of aboriginal 
                                                 
3   This section draws importantly on Figueroa & Barron (2005)  
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tongues are mostly indigenous, but the converse is not true, especially in urban areas, which 
constitute two thirds of total population (Figueroa and Barron 2005, Ñopo 2004).  Self-
reported race or ethnicity would not work either, because people tend to whiten themselves 
(Ñopo 2004) or hide in the mestizo category, arguably due to racism. Imputed race would 
work, but there is no public database on race at national level.  
  The most extensive study (representative of Peru’s urban areas) using race has been 
carried out by researchers at Group of Analysis for Development (Grade) (Ñopo 2004, Ñopo 
et al. 2004, Torero et al. 2004, Moreno et al. 2004). A racial score was constructed based on 
four main racial characteristics: Asiatic, Black, Indigenous, and White. The score ranged 
from zero to ten, zero meaning that the individual did not have any of the racial 
characteristics of that particular group, and ten meaning that the individual had all the 
characteristics of that group. The score was selected by the interviewees and, independently, 
by the interviewers, who received rigorous training in order to homogenise their racial 
perceptions. 
  Grade’s dataset is the best illustration as to why mother tongue is not a good ethnic 
marker: 79 percent of the individuals in the quintile of the ‘most indigenous’ report Spanish 
as mother tongue. Hence, at least four out of five indigenous have Spanish as mother tongue. 
In the same group, 48 percent declare that their mother’s mother tongue is Spanish as well, 
even though this proves to be a slightly better indicator (shows slightly higher correlation 
with the ethnic score). Although this is an urban sample, it is worth noting that roughly two 
thirds of Peru’s population lives in urban areas. So, even if mother tongue were a good ethnic 
marker in rural areas, the results for two thirds of the sample would be inaccurate. 
  With this dataset, Ñopo (2004) suggests that after controlling for a large set of 
characteristics, there are racially related earnings differences in favour of predominantly 
white employees. However, in the case of self-employed workers, none of the empirical 
distribution of differences differs from zero in any case. 
   Ñopo et al. (2004) find a difference of nearly 50 percent between the incomes of the 
individuals in the highest and lowest percentiles (percentiles 100 and 1, respectively) of 
white intensity. After controlling for observable characteristics the gap shrinks to 12 percent 
(roughly one fourth of the initial gap). Interpreting their results for the purposes of this paper, 
3/4 of the gap is due to exclusion, and 1/4 to discrimination. It must be kept in mind that this 
is the most extreme gap.  
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  Ethnic groups in Peru may be defined at different levels. A very general classification 
would be in three layers: indigenous, mixed, and white. However, there are several types of 
indigenous people. Indigenous people are usually associated to the Quechua people, because 
the Quechua ruled in the time of the Inca Empire. The Quechua ruled politically over almost 
half of South America, but they did not dominate culturally over their whole territory. They 
dominated culturally in what are now Peru’s Southern Andes and the north-west of Bolivia, 
but not so in the rest of the Empire. For instance, despite Quechua is the main indigenous 
language in the Andes, Quechua speakers use different versions of the language (Quechua 
mixed with the original local languages, and sometimes even with Spanish), some of these 
versions being unintelligible between them. 
  Referring to the current political map of Peru, different indigenous groups existed in 
the Coast (e.g. Paracas, Pachacamac, Chimu), in the rest of the Andes (e.g. Caxamarca, 
Wanka), and in the Amazonian, most of which was not conquered by the Inca empire (e.g. 
Ashaninkas, Huitotos). One could go on to describe each group in these regions, but this 
would require more detailed databases. However, the breakdown proposed here indeed gives 
insights of the ethnic composition of Peru. An indigenous from the Northern Coast may have 
the same social status than one of the Southern Coast, but they are different from, say, the 
Andean indigenous. Furthermore, there is a clear divide between the indigenous from the 
Southern Andes (strongest Inca influence) and from the rest of the Andes. In turn, the 
Amazonian hosts dozens of different groups, but for the purposes of the present paper they 
will be treated as one. The Spaniards settled mainly in Lima and in the main cities of the 
interior, most of which now constitute capitals of the departments. Lima constituted an 
attractor of massive flows of migration from the interior of the country, mainly indigenous 
people. These flows settled in the outskirts of Lima, constituting what are now huge 
shantytowns, but not in the residential districts, what is called the ‘white core’ of Lima. 
  Figueroa and Barron (2005) took this line of argument and, based on Peruvian history 
and geography, proposed seven ethnic groups based on the region of birth of the individuals. 
A similar argument was also proposed by Haya de la Torre, a Peruvian political leader and 
thinker of the early XX century, and the first to put forward the indigenous problem as a 
political issue in 1923 (Mariategui 1924). ‘Our social problem is rooted in the Coast and in 
the Andes. The Coastal worker is Yunga (regional indigenous), black, Asiatic, white, or a 
mixture of these types (…).The Andean worker is indigenous, somewhat mixed with white in  
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the North, and pure Quechua or Aymara in the South’ (Haya de la Torre 1984 [1923]: 24, my 
translation). 
  Two different ethnic breakdowns are used in this paper. In first place ‘indigenous’ 
and ‘non-indigenous’ are treated as broad groups; and in second place a breakdown of these 
groups. ‘Indigenous’ was split into four groups (Coast, Central and Northern Andes, 
Southern Andes, and Amazonian); and ‘non-indigenous’ into three groups (Lima-core, Lima-
periphery, and Local-core). Even though region of birth is not a perfect ethnic marker, it 
should be accepted that it is at least highly correlated with ethnicity. 
  This methodology gives the highest estimate of indigenous population in Peru. 
According to the definition proposed by Figueroa and Barron (2005), two thirds of the 
population is indigenous. This makes Peru comparable with Bolivia, where over 60 percent 
of the population is indigenous. Other studies give Peru at most 50 percent of indigenous 
population (Trivelli 2005). A straightforward task to contrast empirically the validity of the 
ethnic variable proposed by Figueroa and Barron (2005) is to contrast of place of birth with 
Grade’s database on imposed race. However this was not possible, because the database was 
not publicly available at the time of writing. 
 
5.2  Income by ethnic groups 
  INEI provides inflation-corrected versions of the monetary variables (INEI 2004: 18). 
However, the main source of price variation is not inflation, but geographic region
4. 
Therefore, a geographic deflator is needed to get meaningful variables. INEI computed 
poverty lines by district, split between rural and urban, i.e. each district is split in two: urban 
and rural. For simplicity each of these parts will be called a ‘zone’. 
  Any zone can be used as a numéraire. However, Metropolitan Lima is an especially 
appealing candidate for the following reasons: (a) it is intuitive to deflate the rest of the zones 
with respect to the capital; (b) it does not have rural areas, so it has only one poverty line; (c) 
it has the largest number of observations, so it is the most solid poverty line; and (d) it can 
                                                 
4   In fact, inflation has been rather low between 2000 and 2006, with a maximum of 2.5 percent 
per year since 2000.  
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serve as a consistency check: since Lima is the most expensive city in Peru, all the rest 
should have lower poverty lines
5. 
  In order to express all the monetary variables in terms of Lima’s price level, the 





W w × =  
 Where  wi is the real value for zone i, Wi is the nominal value for zone i, PL is the 
poverty line for Lima, and Pi is the poverty line of the zone i. 
  Table 1 shows the share of population aged 25 and over by level of education and 
their mean net real income. The income variable is the sum of (after tax) monetary, in-kind, 
and extraordinary income. Whereas 70 percent of the non-indigenous population has 
completed high school education or more, 70 percent of the indigenous population have at 
most elementary school. This is a clear example of exclusion in the access to education. 
  To test formally for differences in incomes, two types of tests were performed. In 
first place, t tests (allowing for unequal variances) for differences in mean incomes; and in 
second place, non-parametric tests for difference in median income. For every level of 
education the difference in mean and median income between indigenous and non-
indigenous is significant at 99 percent of confidence. 
  With the ‘broad’ definition of ethnic groups, the starkest result is that the mean 
income for non-indigenous is twice the mean income for indigenous, even excluding the 
elite, which is usually underrepresented in household surveys and is overwhelmingly non-
indigenous (Figueroa 2002). Despite being one third of total population, the non-indigenous 
have almost one half of aggregate income. Including the elite, their share of income might be 
even over 50 percent. 
                                                 
5   The range goes from 0.51 to 1.00 of Lima’s poverty line, so the consistency of the database is 
not rejected by this test.  
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Table 1. Peru: Mean Real Income and Level of Education [1], by ethnic groups 
 Non-Indigenous  Indigenous  Difference 
Level of Education  %  income [2] %  income  [2]  [3] 
No Level  9.7 3,986 38.9 2,285   *** 
Elementary School  20.3 7,014 29.6 5,092   *** 
High School  40.0 9,232 20.9 8,200   *** 
Superior 29.9 23,445 10.6 19,013   *** 
Total 100.0 13,145   100.0 7,369   *** 
Notes: [1] For population aged 25 or older [2] Mean yearly income in real Nuevos Soles 
(Lima=100) [3] t test of equality of means ***,**,*: significant at 99, 95 and 90 percent, 
assuming unequal variances in each distribution. Source: Enaho 2003-2004 
 
Table 2. Peru: Income and Population by ethnic groups 








Broad ethnic groups 
Non-Indigenous 33.3 46.7 10,835 
Indigenous 66.7 53.3 4,539 
Total 100.0 100.0 6,244 
Disaggregated ethnic groups 
Lima – Core  3.8 10.7 19,038 
Lima – Periphery  15.1 25.3 11,262 
Local Core  14.4 18.6 8,679 
Rest Coast  16.4 15.9 6,562 
Amazonian 10.0 5.7 3,884 
Northern and Highlands  21.7 12.9 4,023 
Southern Highlands  18.6 10.8 3,924 
Total 100.0 100.0 6,244 
[1] Income in Lima prices in May 2003. Source: Enaho 2003 
 
  Lima-Core is the category that proxies the ‘white’ population. Lima-Periphery and 
Local Core are mostly mestizos, but may also include whites. The rest are indigenous  
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regions. Once disaggregated ethnic groups are taken into account, inequality is exacerbated 
when comparing the ‘whites’ with the other groups. 
  Figure 2 shows the yearly income by age and ethnicity. Both streams lie outside the 
other’s 95 percent confidence intervals. The upper curve is for the non-indigenous, whereas 
the lower one is for the indigenous. The difference in the expected stream of incomes is 
shocking. Taking an interest rate of 3.5 percent per year
6, the Net Present Value of the 
expected flow of lifetime incomes for a mean 14 year old indigenous is around S/.109,000 
(US$ 31,000), whereas it is more than double for the mean non-indigenous, up to S/.251,500 
(US$72,000). For a better understanding of these figures, GDP per capita in Peru is around 
US$2,000, so while an indigenous worker would get 15.5 times the GDP per capita 
throughout his lifetime, an non-indigenous would get 36 times the GDP per capita.
7 
 





















































Source: Enaho 2003     
                                                 
6   This rate approximately resembles Peru’s Central Bank interest rate, which was 3.6 percent in 
January 2006. 
7   In the case of the non-indigenous, there is a rather suspicious peak between ages 56 and 64. To 
test for the possibility of sampling, the same procedure was followed with the 2002 survey. The 
series (not reported, but available upon request) fall within their 95 percent confidence intervals, 
so there does not appear to be evidence of sampling problems.  
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Figure 3. Peru: Years of Schooling by Age 




















Source: Enaho 2003     
 
  Figure 3 shows the years of schooling by age. It is clear that mean years of education 
for indigenous people peaks for the population in their early 20s at around 9 years of 
schooling, and then start declining steadily, with the older cohorts around a mean of 3 years 
of schooling. For the non-indigenous, the peak is reached at 28 years, with a mean of more 
than 12 years of schooling, and for the older cohorts the average is more than 11 years (i.e. 
complete secondary) until the age of 50. The oldest cohorts have around on average 8 years 
of schooling (more than complete primary). A positive aspect is that the gap in years of 
schooling seems to be closing. 
 
6.  DECOMPOSITION OF INEQUALITY INDICES 
  Table 3 shows that the within-group component of inequality accounts for the most 
important share of overall inequality, over 90 percent. Between-group inequality accounts for 
around 9 percent. This is consistent with estimates by individual income, where within-group 
inequality accounted for around 6 percent of overall inequality.  
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  These figures are more important than they appear at first sight. If one randomly 
splits the population into two groups, the between-group inequality should be non-existent 
(Anand 1983). The fact that it explains up to 9 percent of overall Peru’s inequality is actually 
worrying. 
 
Table 3. Decomposition of Theil’s T Measure of  
household income, by 7 ethnic groups 
 T  Measure Share 
T within  0.549  91.4 
T between  0.052  8.6 




Table 4. Breakdown of Within-group Inequality (by households) 
 Non-Indigenous  Indigenous 
 A1  A2  A3  B  C  D  E 
Total 
Theil’s T measure  0.474 0.445 0.517 0.401 0.452  0.656  0.611  0.601 
Sample Size  109  820  2,937 3,056 1,930  4,563  5,415  18,830
Contribution to Tw  0.003 0.019 0.081 0.065 0.046  0.159  0.176   
Contribution to Overall 
inequality (%)  0.5  3.2 13.4  10.8 7.7 26.5  29.3 91.4 
Source: Enaho 2003
  
  Table 4 shows the breakdown of within-group inequality of household income. Two 
striking facts arise from Table 4. In first place, the contribution of within-group non-
indigenous inequality to overall inequality is low: taken together, their within-group 
inequality accounts for 16 percent of overall inequality. Secondly, groups D and E 
(indigenous from the Central and Northern Highlands and indigenous from the Southern 
Highlands) are the biggest contributors to inequality. Together they account for over 55 
percent of overall inequality.   
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7.  ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION OF INCOME EQUATIONS 
  In this section econometric analysis will be undertaken. Two problems arise in the 
estimation of the equations: econometric endogeneity and non-normality of the dependent 
variable, due to a significant proportion of workers with null incomes (unpaid workers). 
Despite the former issue is usually assessed, the latter has been ignored in the literature. 
However, unpaid workers represent a significant sample of the sample (18%) and they are 
mostly indigenous, so ignoring them would affect the results seriously. 
  The dependent variable in the following equations is not the usual hourly income, but 
annualised income instead. The reason is that time spent working is driven by restrictions 
from the employer more than by the worker’s preferences. Given current labour conditions in 
Peru, the employer may force the worker to work more hours without paying for the extra 
time. The wage is set per month, week, or day, not per hour. Hence, worked hours enter as 
exogenous regressors. Moreover, if hourly income were estimated, then to estimate 
inequality it would have to be multiplied by the number of hours worked assuming a linear 
relationship. To test for increasing, constant, or decreasing marginal returns to time worked, 
the square value of working hours per week is included. 
  One equation was estimated for each ethnic group (using the broad definition), to 
avoid including an excessive number of interaction dummies and then the difference between 
the coefficients was analysed following the same procedure as in section 4.2. Splitting the 
sample in two is not expected to affect the efficiency of the results because of the relatively 
big sample size (9,181 and 31,599 observations for non-indigenous and indigenous, 
respectively). 
 
7.1  Non-Normality of the Endogenous Variable 
  More than 18 percent of the sample is constituted by unpaid workers, therefore the 
dependent variable cannot be assumed to be normally distributed. Trivelli using the 2002 
Enaho erroneously drops them out of the sample (Trivelli 2005: 72). They cannot be 
dropped, because unpaid workers are mostly indigenous (23 percent of indigenous are unpaid 
workers, whereas only 8 percent of non-indigenous fall in this category) and therefore by 
doing this the results are biased towards underestimation of interethnic income inequality. 
Unpaid workers’ remuneration can actually be treated as if it were actually zero. They  
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typically receive housing, (cooked) food, and sometimes education. However, this is not an 
in-kind payment. They receive consumption goods as any other member of the family, but 
they do not decide what will be the payment, nor are free to dispose of it freely. 
  To tackle down the problem of null incomes, Tobit models were estimated. This type 
of models has two parts. In a first stage, a probit model estimates the probability of the 
outcome being non-zero, conditional on the set of regressors. In the second stage, an OLS 
model estimates the expected value of the outcome (conditional on the same set of 
regressors) given that the outcome is greater than zero. The Mincerian specification was used 
as a baseline. 
  A shortcoming of Tobit models is that the same set of regressors is used in both 
stages. Different variables may affect one stage but not the other, so including them in both 
regressions would lead to a problem of inclusion of irrelevant variables, resulting in 
inefficient parameter estimates. Omitting the variables might lead to a worse problem. 
Furthermore, by construction of the model the marginal effect of each variable has the same 
sign both in determining the probability of having a positive outcome and of the size of the 
outcome, given that it is positive. This assumption may be too restrictive. To relax it, two-
tiered models were estimated. In the first stage, the probability of being a remunerated 
worker was modelled. In the second stage, the income equation was specified. Using the 
same set of regressors proved not to be a problem in this case because both sets of regressors 
had the same type of effects in each tier. 
  The idea underlying the hurdle formulations is that a binomial probability model 
governs the binary outcome of whether a variable has a zero or a positive value. If the 
realisation is positive, the ‘hurdle is crossed’, and the conditional distribution of the positives 
is governed by a truncated-at-zero model (Mullahy 1986). 
  The starting point will be the hurdle model proposed by Wooldridge (2002: 536-538): 
) ( 1 ) | 0 ( γ Φ − = = x x y P          ( 1 )  
) , ( ~ ) 0 , ( | ) log(
2 σ β > x N y x y         ( 2 )  
  Equation (1) Gives the probability of the outcome being zero, and equation (2) the 
expected value of the log outcome conditional on X and it being positive. Φ is the standard  
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normal cumulative distribution,γ is the vector of parameters of the probit model, x is the 
matrix of regressors,β is the vector of parameters of the OLS regression, and
2 σ  is the 
variance of the distribution of the logarithm of y conditional on x and y>0. 
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 With  Di=0 when y=0 and Di=1 when y>0. ML estimates can be obtained in the 
traditional way. Since the log-likelihood function is separable with respect to the parameter 
vectorsβandγ, the log-likelihood can always be written as the sum of the log-likelihoods 
from two separate models: a binomial probability and a truncated-at-zero model. Hence, the 
function can always be maximised, without loss of information, by maximising the two 
components separately. Therefore, γ ˆ are the ML parameters for the probit model. In a similar 
fashion, β ˆ  are the OLS parameters from the regression of log(y) on x using the observations 
for which the outcome is greater than zero. Finally,σcan be consistently estimated by the 
standard error of the OLS regression (Wooldridge 2003: 537).  
  Since hurdle models are not developed in textbooks, the marginal effects of the 
regressors will now be specified. When xj is linear in both tiers, the marginal effect is: 
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 and  when  xj is quadratic in both tiers it becomes: 
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  This covers the cases of most of the variables included in the regressions. When a 
variable is not included in one tier, the marginal effect corresponding to that tier is zero 
(because its coefficient is equal to zero).  


































































, | (6) 
  The first term of the RHS is the elasticity of the probability of obtaining a positive 
outcome with respect to xj, and the second term is the elasticity of the expected value of the 
outcome, given that it is positive, with respect to xj. 
  Elasticities and marginal effects depend on the values of all the parameters. The 
convention is to evaluate them at the mean values of the regressors.  
  An important advantage of the separability property is that other methods can be used 
in the second tier. For instance, Aslam and Kingdon (2005) use a Heckit model in the second 
tier to address selectivity bias. Exploiting this property, three alternative models were used to 
estimate income in the second stage. The three approaches will be discussed below. 
 
7.2  Econometric Endogeneity 
  Mincerian equations are a natural starting point for estimating income equations. It is 
well-known that they show problems arising from the correlation between education and 
unobserved factors, innate ability being the typical example. This has been labelled 
econometric endogeneity, under which OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. Since 
education is likely to be positively correlated with innate ability, OLS estimates should be 
upward biased. Therefore, typical Mincerian equations can be expected to give an upper limit 
to the returns to education
8. 
                                                 
8    However, some literature finds even higher returns to education after controlling for 
endogeneity.  
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  This problem can be solved via IV or 2SLS (H2SLS), if informative and valid 
instruments were available. An instrument is informative if it is correlated with the variable 
that is going to be instrumented (education), and is valid if it is not correlated with the 
unobservable characteristics (e.g. ability). Several variables have been proposed as 
instruments for education: number of children, distance to school, and mother’s education, 
but they are not available in the survey. 
  A dummy variable for public schooling is used as an instrument. Children attending a 
public school reflect lower income of their parents. Children from low-income households 
receive less education, irrespective of their ability. So, attending a public school is correlated 
with receiving less years of formal education and not with the individual’s ability. It might be 
argued that public might be correlated with parents’ ability, based on that higher ability leads 
to higher parents’ income, allowing the child to attend a private school. However, in Peru, 
where exclusion plays a central role, path dependence seems to be more important than 
ability in the determination of education and incomes. Poor people tend to remain poor and 
rich people tend to become richer. So ‘public’ is not likely to be correlated with ability, only 
with parents education (which in turn is correlated with the individuals education). Another 
argument against ‘public’ is that, being a dummy, it is not a good predictor of the number of 
years of education. Hence, other instruments must be included, therefore estimating a 2SLS. 
In the 2SLS approximation, one variable must be trusted to be exogenous, and the validity of 
the other instruments can be tested based on this variable. ‘Public’ will be the variable with 
which the exogeneity of the rest will be tested. Age and weekly hours worked were also used 
as instruments. 
  An interesting instrument, and not used in the IV literature, might be sector of 
employment. It may be argued that, controlling by labour category, sector of employment 
should be correlated with education, but not with ability. For instance, people who work in 
agriculture need less years of formal education and people who work in manufactures tend to 
have longer years of education. However, the direction of causality is not clear: it might be 
that, given that the individual acquires certain number of years of schooling, he decides to 
work in a specific sector (instead of deciding the years of education according to the sector 
where she wants to work). Therefore this variable will not be used as an instrument. 
  A second way of dealing with endogeneity, although less elegant, is to include 
proxies for ability (HProxies). In the case of the regression with proxies, the assumption is  
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that given the same years of education and the same sector of the economy, the individual’s 
ability will determine her labour category, whether she works in the capital or in the interior, 
and the size of the firm where she works at. It must be noticed that labour category is not 
even an ordinal scale: despite a clear ordering may arise between employer, white collar, 
blue collar, and self-employed rural; the ordering with respect to self-employed urban is not 
clear, because this category includes street vendors, lawyers with private offices and 
independent consultants. The same problem arises with the size of the firm: bigger firms tend 
to pay higher incomes, except private buffets, independent consultants, etc. However, very 
small fractions of the population fall in these categories, so serious problems are not 
expected. 
  All proxies for ability are also correlated with education. For instance, having longer 
years of education increases the probability of being a white collar. So ‘white collar’ will 
partially capture the individual’s ability, but also the effect of education on income via the 
increase in the probability of being white collar. Thus, the returns to education obtained by 
this method will tend to be biased downwards. 
  Other factors also influence in the quality of education, as the size of the school, peer 
effects, amongst others. There is a vast literature on education production functions (see 
Glewwe 2002 for a survey, or the work by Hanushek 2003, Krueger 2003, Todd & Wolpin 
2003, Case & Deaton 1999) but the necessary information is not included in the survey. 
  A third way to deal with the econometric endogeneity of education is by household 
fixed effects (HFE). The key assumption is that unobserved ability is similar for household 
members. This might not be true. FE estimation subtracts household means from the 
observed values, and by doing so it eliminates unobserved characteristics that are constant 
across household members. It is important to note that by this procedure, households with 
one income earner must be discarded from the sample. In practice this might bias the results, 
but there is no strong prior as to how much or in which direction. Despite the assumption of 
similar ability may be easily acceptable between parents and children, or between brothers, it 
is not the case between spouses. Therefore, the HFE estimation seems to be the weakest 
methodology of the three proposed here.  
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Table 5. Returns to Education on Annualised Income [1] 
Econometric Specification  Non-Indigenous  Indigenous 
Mincerian equation  12.8  12.0 
Tobit, Mincerian Specification  15.5  12.6 
Hurdle with 2SLS  18.1  13.8 
Hurdle with proxies for ability  8.8  5.5 
Hurdle with FE  11.3  11.1 
 [1] All the models are evaluated at the mean values of the 




8.  RESULTS 
 
8.1  Returns to Education 
  Table 5 shows the returns to education of all the specifications tested, and Table 6 
presents the most important results for the hurdle models
9. The Mincerian equation gives 
returns to education of 12.8 and 12.0 percent for non-indigenous and indigenous, 
respectively. When the mass of zero incomes is assessed via Tobit regressions, the returns to 
both groups increase to 15.5 and 12.6 percent, and the difference is statistically significant at 
the 95 percent. The two-tiered models, which relax some of the restrictions of the Tobit, give 
contrasting results: when 2SLS is used to instrument for education, 18 and 14 percent; when 
proxies for ability are included, the resulting returns to education are 9 percent for the non-
indigenous and 6 percent for the indigenous. The difference in this case is significant at the 
95 percent of confidence. HFE results in 11.3 and 11.1, though the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
 
8.2  Marginal Effects of Education 
  In this section the marginal effects of the non-linear models will be assessed. Since 
the hurdle models with correction for endogeneity are argued to be the best specification only 
these will be analysed in detail. 
 
                                                 
9   To comply with space limits, it was not possible to include and analyse adequately the results 
for all the regressions. The results are available on request.  
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Table 6. Probability of Being Paid, Expected Income for Paid Workers, and Marginal Effects of 
Education for the Hurdle Models [1] 
Indigenous              
Paid  0.791  (mean  probability)      
 mean  X  gamma  X    2SLS    Proxies    FE   
Schooling [3]  7.9  0.086 ***  0.144 *** 0.060  ***  0.114 ***
Public [4]  0.9  -0.031     -0.068  ***  0.094 ***
Age [5]  38.6  0.077 ***  0.059 *** 0.070  ***  0.055 ***
Age^2 1489.6  -0.001 ***  -0.001 *** -0.001  ***  -0.001 ***
Hours [6]  38.9  0.001   0.034 *** 0.029  ***  0.053 ***
Hours^2 1511.0  0.000 ***  0.000 *** 0.000  ***  0.000 ***
Size [7]  58.3  0.000  *** 
Lima [8]  0.1  0.196  *** 
SE (u) [8]    1.36625 1.26760    1.32588
Observations   25149 19900 19728    13019
(Pseudo) R2    0.13 0.22 0.33    0.25
Betaj [9]     0.144 0.060    0.114
BetaX/SE(u) [10]    2.569 2.266    2.802
Gamma(X) [11]    0.999 0.999    0.999
          
Marginal Effect of Education, Hurdle Models [12]  0.138 0.055    0.111
              
Non-Indigenous    
Paid 0.895  (mean  probability)     
  mean X  gamma X 2SLS Proxies    FE
Schooling [3]  11.1  0.055 ***  0.190 *** 0.093  ***  0.119 ***
Public [4]  0.8  -0.106     -0.157  ***  0.113  
Age 35.5  0.083 ***  0.025 **  0.049  ***  0.054 ***
Age^2 1263.6  -0.001 ***  0.000   0.000  ***  -0.001 ***
Hours [5]  42.7  0.017 ***  0.042 *** 0.032  ***  0.044 ***
Hours^2 1827.4  0.000   0.000 *** 0.000  ***  0.000 ***
Size [6]  106.0      0.000  ***   
Lima [7]  0.3      0.214  *** 
SE (u) [8]      1.07874   0.98689    1.02085
Observations   8261   7394 7249    4323
(Pseudo) R2    0.12 0.28 0.41    0.26
Betaj [9]     0.190 0.093    0.119
BetaX/SE(u) [10]    8.217 8.888    8.635
Gamma(X) [11]    0.952 0.952    0.952
          
Marginal Effect of Education, Hurdle Models [12]  0.181 0.088    0.113
 
[1] at mean values, for workers aged 14 and over [2] Included, but not reported: month, sector of the economy and constant 
[3] years of formal schooling [4] dummy taking the value of one if the individual attended a public school [5] Hours worked 
per week [6] Size of the firm [7] dummy taking the value of one if the individual lives in Metropolitan Lima. [8] Standard 
Error of the residual [9] Coefficient of education [10] linear prediction over [8], [11] cumulative standard normal density 
function of being paid. [12] Computed according to equation (4), evaluated at mean values. Source: Enaho 2003.  
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  Marginal effects of hurdle models, as discussed above, are not constant. They depend 
on all the estimated coefficients, including the standard deviation of the residual, and on the 
specific values of the regressors. To illustrate the implications of the three models, the 
marginal effects of education are shown in Table 6. These results are obtained by applying 
equations (4) and (5) to each specification with all the regressors evaluated at their mean 
values (also shown in Table 6). 
  Since hurdle models are non-linear, the information provided by Table 6 is not 
enough to draw strong conclusions. To get a better picture, the marginal effects of education 
at each year of schooling were obtained (holding the other variables at their mean values). 
The results are shown in Figure 4A to 4C. One must have in mind that the results will change 
for every change in the explanatory variables. Any other the calculations can be made with 
the coefficients in Table 6 and equations 4 and 5. 
  H2SLS and HProxies show a slightly narrowing gap in the returns to education by 
ethnic groups, whereas HFE shows a gap that shrinks significantly with an increase in 
education. According to HFE, education is equalising especially after high school. 
   As expected, in every case non-indigenous show higher returns to education than 
indigenous. However, the differences are particularly low for the basic Mincerian 
specification as well as for the HFE
10. Which are the ‘true’ returns to education? The last 
three models are likely to be closest because they assess non-normality of the residual and 
endogeneity bias. However, the way endogeneity bias is assessed seems to play a central role 
in the determination of returns to education. 
  According to previous arguments, HFE seems to be the weakest methodology in this 
sense. Ability may vary widely between spouses; the children’s ability is likely to be a 
function of their parents’, but not the same, thus HFE seems to be the weakest methodology. 
As discussed before, HProxies will tend to underestimate the effects of education but there is 
no strong prior that the biases will differ between groups. Since ‘public’ seems to be a valid 
and informative instrument, H2SLS will be treated as the best model. It is worth noticing that 
                                                 
10   The lower gap in the Mincerian specification is reasonable, because it drops the null incomes 
(that represent a higher percentage of the indigenous labour force than of the non-indigenous 
labour force), thus leading to the underestimation of the income gaps.  
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HProxies and H2SLS predict similar differences in the returns to education between ethnic 
groups, of 3.3 and 4.3 percent, respectively. 
































































































9.  SIMULATION: EFFECTS OF EXCLUSION AND DISCRIMINATION ON 
INEQUALITY 
  In this section exclusion and discrimination will be eliminated by performing 
simulations with the coefficients from the hurdle models, and inequality will be estimated in 
each case. This can be understood only as an initial approach to compare the effects of 
exclusion and discrimination. In a first simulation, income will be estimated for indigenous, 
with the estimated returns of the non-indigenous. This will give an idea of what would 
inequality look like if both groups had the same returns to each variable. 
  The second simulation tries to answer what would inequality look like were there no 
exclusion. This exercise might be more difficult to understand, and has not been assessed 
previously. Without exclusion, indigenous people would tend to have the same values in the 
determinants of income as the non-indigenous people, i.e. the same distribution of 
explanatory variables. For instance, since the indigenous are excluded from the education 
process, they don’t have access to education to the same degree as the non-indigenous. If 
both groups had the same degree of access to education as the non-indigenous, they would 
tend to have the same distribution of years education. The same applies to the other 
determinants of income. Hence, without exclusion, indigenous and non-indigenous people 
would tend to have similar values of the explanatory variables. Following this line of 
argument, an ‘exclusion-free’ income distribution was simulated using the explanatory 
variables for the non-indigenous with the returns obtained for the indigenous population for 
each hurdle model. This gives a smaller sample size for the indigenous population, because 
in the EAP the ratio of indigenous to non-indigenous is close to 3:1. In order to get a sample 
size similar to the indigenous population, each of these observations was three-folded
11. This 
new series and the observed income for the non-indigenous constitute the ‘exclusion free’ 
income distribution. The resulting inequality is labelled ‘exclusion-free’ inequality. The same 
exercise was repeated for each hurdle model. 
  To assess the mass of null incomes, individuals with a probability of less than 60 
percent of having a positive income are assigned a null income. Using 50 and 70 percent as 
thresholds leaves the main results unaffected.  
                                                 
11   This is not completely accurate, because the survey has a complex stratification structure, and 
weights vary along the population, but that is not being assessed. Thus, this must be seen as a 
rough approximation only.  
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  The results are shown in Table 9. Gini index for the sample is 0.64. If both groups 
had the same returns to the determinants of income, Gini would be reduced to 0.51 in 
average. If, having different returns, both groups had the same distribution of variables, Gini 
index would be reduced even more, to 0.46. This shows that exclusion seems to play even a 
bigger role than discrimination in explaining inequality than the income gap. 
  Using definitions that are consistent with the ones adopted in this paper and with the 
same dataset, Figueroa (2006) studies the role of ethnicity in the relationship between human 
capital and the labour market. Briefly consider three groups: the white elite (group A1), the 
mixed (groups A2 and A3) and the indigenous (groups B, C, D, and E). Figueroa (2006) 
using data from Cruzado (2006) shows that despite the indigenous population appears to be 
catching up with the white elite in years of education, the groups are not converging in 
incomes. So, apparently increases in education will not reduce inter-ethnic inequality. 
However, no attention is paid to the convergence between the indigenous and the mixed 
population.  In addition, the small sample size of the white elite does not allow to arrive to 
solid statistical conclusions when this group is split into age-groups
12. Table 8, adapted from 
Figueroa (2006) shows that indigenous people appear to be catching up with the mixed in 
years of education and income. While the indigenous/mixed ratio of years of education for 
the 55-65 cohort is 0.56, the figure for the 25-34 cohort is 0.92. Similarly, while the ratio of 
incomes is 0.29 for the 55-65 cohort, the ratio for the 25-34 cohort is 0.69.  
  Since education seems to play at least a partial role in reducing inequality, some 
policy experiments will be sketched to illustrate the relevance of the results presented in 
section 8. Their effects on inequality are presented in Table 9
13: 
                                                 
12   For instance, the 55-65 cohort, used as a baseline, includes only 6 observations, which is not 
sufficient to arrive to solid statistical conclusions (see Figueroa 2006: 35-36, Table 6A and 
Table 6B for more details). 
13   For the sake of space, only the results for the H2SLS model are presented, but the other models 
are consistent.  
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Table 8. Inter-generational differences in years of schooling (mean years of schooling) 
and income (mean soles per month) 
Cohort   
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-65 
Income      
Indigenous 530 596 623 473 
Mixed 771 987 1195 1626 
Ratio 0.69 0.60 0.52 0.29 
Years of schooling      
Indigenous 11 8 7 5 
Mixed 12 12 11 9 
Ratio 0.92 0.67 0.64 0.56 
Source: Enaho 2003, adapted from Figueroa (2006: Table 6A and 6B) 
 
1.  Policy 1: Increase one year of schooling for the indigenous people who didn’t finish 
high school. 
2.  Policy 2: Increase three years of schooling for the indigenous people who didn’t 
finish high school, or guarantee they finish high school, whatever is lower.  
3.  Policy 3: Increase 5 years of schooling for the indigenous people who didn’t finish 
high school, or guarantee they finish high school, whatever is lower 
4.  Policy 4: Guarantee that all indigenous who finish high school also finish technical 
studies (2 years after high school). 
  
  Policy 1 can be interpreted as a short term policy, Policy 2 as a medium term, and 
Policy 3 as long term. They would benefit around 70 percent of the indigenous population 
(Table 1). These three policies would have similar effects on income inequality. An increase 
of one year has a similar effect as an increase in 3 or 5 years, because the ethnic gap is high 
and roughly constant at the first stages of education (figures 4A to 4C). However, this does 
not imply that education should be increased in one year only, for education is a human right, 
an end in itself. It increases human liberties and capabilities (Sen 1999) and fosters political 
citizenship (Ames ed. 1978). Therefore, the evaluation of the returns to education based just 
on the effect of education on income consists in an underestimation of the true effects. 
  Policy 4 shows that post high school studies have a stronger impact on income 
distribution. Except for Theil’s second measure, Policy 4 implies the highest reduction in 
inequality. Policy 4 basically guarantees technical education to all the indigenous high school  
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graduates. Despite this policy would benefit only 30 percent of the indigenous population, its 
effects on inequality are higher, because the inter-ethnic income gap is lower at the higher 
levels of education (Figures 4A to 4C). In addition, this policy would also give incentives to 
parents to send their children to school, knowing that after that the State would guarantee 
superior studies, and therefore higher incomes. 
Table 8. Simulations of income inequality indices 
H2SLS HProxies  HHFE 
inequality measures  Income no disc  no excl  no disc  no excl  no disc  no excl
Relative mean deviation  0.47  0.38  0.31  0.37  0.32  0.35  0.33 
Gini coefficient  0.64  0.52  0.44  0.51  0.46  0.50  0.48 
Theil entropy measure  0.82  0.53  0.40  0.53  0.41  0.54  0.51 
Theil mean log deviation measure  0.43  0.41  0.22  0.38  0.24  0.34  0.24 
 
Table 9. Policy Simulations, H2SLS model 
 Status  Quo  POL1  POL2  POL3  POL4 
Relative mean deviation  0.47  0.39  0.38  0.39  0.37 
Gini coefficient  0.64  0.54  0.54  0.55  0.51 
Theil entropy measure  0.82  0.62  0.62  0.62  0.54 
Theil mean log deviation measure  0.43  0.24  0.24  0.25  0.40 
  
  Targeting issues arise. Positive discrimination can also be dangerous. Being non-
indigenous does not mean being educated or non-poor. Many non-indigenous people also 
need assistance from the State, and they cannot be left aside. 
  Does the State have incentives to pursue these policies? If the State maximises votes, 
it lacks incentives to expand education. In the short term, it is more politically profitable to 
give ‘gifts’ than ‘rights’ (Figueroa 2003). While the former consist of basic social assistance, 
food, and clothing, the latter include education, healthcare, and political citizenship.  
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  The success of the policies illustrated here requires not only the supply of education, 
construction of schools, and hiring of more teachers; demand might also require incentives: 
e.g. to offer breakfast at school, free uniforms, books.  
  Endless policies can be simulated. For example, these models could be used to assess 
the effects of universalising primary schooling (attributing 6 years of schooling to anyone 
who has less than that). Policies not necessarily related to education can also be assessed, as 
promoting migration to the capital or giving incentives to employers to hire formal 
employment (which would also lessen the uncertainty effects of being self-employed).   
 
10.   CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
  Between-group inequality contributes to almost 10 percent of overall inequality; and 
that is reflected on important differences in average income between indigenous and non-
indigenous. Mean income for the non-indigenous people is twice than that for the indigenous. 
Moreover, expected lifetime income for an average indigenous worker is just 44 percent of 
the figure for the average non-indigenous worker. 
  The econometric analysis in section 8.2 has shown that education has positive effects 
on income, with diminishing marginal effects at each year of schooling. Age and hours 
worked also show positive but decreasing marginal returns. The difference in the distribution 
of years of schooling seems to be one of the most important sources of inequality. Despite 
public education is regarded as low-quality, promoting it would have positive effects on 
income. This does not mean that quality does not matter, but that, being income inequality so 
severe, any improvement will help. However, other policies should be directed to tackle 
down the problems outlined by Figueroa (2006:11-17). 
  The literature focuses on the differences in the slopes of the regression lines 
(discrimination), but usually neglects the importance of the distribution of the regressors 
(exclusion). Trivelli (2005) is a notable exception in this respect, but her methodology leaves 
aside the population with null incomes and therefore her results are arguably biased. Taking 
the problems of econometric endogeneity of education and of truncation-at-zero of the 
income distribution, this paper has shown that exclusion explains a larger share of income 
inequality than discrimination. According to the simulations performed in section 9, without 
discrimination income inequality (measured by the Gini index) would be reduced by 20  
  32
percent, and without exclusion, by 28 percent. Hence, despite most of research on Peru’s 
interethnic income gap has focused on discrimination, exclusion seems to be a more 
important source of inequality, and therefore more important to tackle down. 
  Partial reductions of exclusion in the access to education would reduce inequality as 
much as the complete elimination of discrimination. Four policies are proposed as 
illustrations in section 8, and it is found that increases of 1 or 2 years of schooling can reduce 
income inequality (as measured by the Gini) by as much as 15 to 20 percent, depending on 
whether the change is in the lower or the upper tails of the distribution of years of education. 
  Policies directed to tackle down exclusion tend to be expensive, both politically and 
economically. As Figueroa (2003) argues, no agent has the incentives and the resources to 
change the observed outcome. The government lacks incentives to destine resources to the 
inclusion of excluded populations, because giving gifts is politically more profitable than 
granting rights. As Barron (forthcoming) shows, this does not seem to be a problem of 
economies of scale either. The agent with both incentives and power to implement these 
policies has not been identified in this paper, which constitutes a serious caveat. 
  The changes in inequality presented here should be taken as lower limits to the actual 
changes. Externalities to lower exclusion or discrimination would transform the whole 
economy: with a better educated labour force, investment in industries that demand qualified 
labour would be profitable, and it is well known that these industries drive up wages, with 
further effects on poverty and inequality. In second place, in a more stable country, financial 
markets can be developed more easily, and therefore credit and insurance would be 
expanded. Although the latter would not reach the poor directly (especially not the rural 
poor), they might be reached indirectly, through social networks
14.  
                                                 
14   The effects are highly complex. For thorough reviews of these mechanisms, see Dercon (2003) 
Fafchamps (2004).  
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